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WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS:




The federal criminal code is not readily adapted to the regula-
tion of complex institutions. As the ultimate sanction, criminal
prosecution may act as an effective deterrent to the more egregious
violations of the banking or securities laws, but it cannot be ex-
pected that such prosecutions serve as the principal or even as a
primary regulating force. The Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are closely involved with
the internal operation of the banks and the Securities and Exchange
Commission performs a similar function in the securities industry.
Bank misapplication and securities fraud cases are frequent fare
for the United States Attorney; however, their regulatory impact
is secondary to that of the sanctions imposed by the administrative
agencies.
It is surprising, then, that our system of private welfare and
pension plans, although admittedly not equal in scope to the bank-
ing or securities industry, is left almost entirely without regulation,
subject to virtually no interference with its internal operations.
These benefit plans are vitally important to millions of people,
yet the only sanction applicable to those charged with the adminis-
tration of the plans is that provided by the criminal law and in-
voked by the federal prosecutor. The prosecutor's role is restricted
principally by the narrowness of the statutory framework, and
secondarily, by the limited manpower available to him and to the
investigative agencies responsible for pursuing statutory violations.
The question of whether this restricted role permits the prosecutor
to have any measurable impact on the integrity of the pension and
benefit system is the principal concern of this article.
Discussions about welfare and pension plans tend to begin
with the revelation that such plans control more than one hundred
billion dollars in assets, and continue with the admonition that no
* A.B. 1960, Swarthmore College; LL.B. 1963, Columbia Law School; Chief,
Management and Labor Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of
Justice. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the
views of the Department of Justice or any other federal agency.
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area of the economy of that magnitude and potential economic im-
pact can remain unregulated. Those concerned will also point out
that benefit plan assets are in fact under the control of a relatively
small group of men whose actions and motivations are subjected to
only minimal restrictions. However, these homilies produce little
either in the way of response from the Congress or from those who
administer the plans-other than horrified disclaimers.
The problem must be attacked at a more practical level: does
the law as it now stands protect the right of the individual plumber,
carpenter, or bricklayer to have his medical bills paid and to col-
lect his pension when he retires? Recent hearings of the Senate
Subcommittee on Labor dealing with proposed legislation1 designed
to reach the increasingly serious problem of the individual's loss of
pension benefits because of job changes, employer bankruptcy, and
other related factors, have taken this practical approach. The record
of the hearings is replete with cases where workers have con-
tributed to their companies' pension plans for twenty-five years,
only to be deprived of benefits at retirement.2 However, this con-
centration on the problems of individual beneficiaries does have its
pitfalls, for it permits the benefit plan industry to claim that the
horror stories placed before the subcommittee were specially selected
for their shock effect. As Senator Javits noted:
It has been stated to the press by officials of certain pension con-
sulting firms that my conclusions on the basis of the preliminary findings
are 'gross misrepresentations of the facts,' that the study is 'falacious
material,' and that it is nothing more than a 'manufactured crisis which
could lead to government control of the private pension system.'
3
The spectre of governmental intrusion into the internal regu-
lation of private pension plans has haunted Congress since the
original Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act was passed.4
At that time, it was decided that the individual worker, given a
minimal amount of information about how his pension plan was
being run, could and would exercise whatever control was needed.
Even the 1962 amendments,' although designed to permit more
direct federal involvement, continued to be based on the theory
that the individual ought to rely primarily on the good faith and
1 The bill before the Subcommittee at the time of the hearings was S. 2, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Senator Javits. On December 14, 1971, the
Administration bill, S. 3024 (H.R. 12337), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), was introduced
by Senator Javits and others.
2 Hearings on Examination of Private Welfare and Pension Plans before the Sub-
committee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
3 Hearings on Welfare and Pension Plans, Id. at 88.
4 Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997.
5 Act of Mar. 20, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35.
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commitment of his employer or union representative and only
secondarily on the good faith and commitment of the federal
government. Whether the federal government, and the federal
prosecutor in particular, have been able to provide even part of the
protection which is so desperately needed, is open to serious ques-
tion.
II. THE PROBLEMS
It is not the purpose of this article to comment on the merits
or demerits of the various legislative proposals which would estab-
lish federal standards for fiduciary conduct,' portability7 vesting,8
and termination.0 The problems addressed here are those bearing on
the applicability of criminal sanctions to the conduct of individuals
dealing with employee benefit plans and the enforcement of those
sanctions.
As a basis for discussion of these problems five typical fact
situations will be considered, some or all of which may call for
the invoking of the criminal process by the federal prosecutor. 10
1. In 1963, a man named Arsham took control of an Ohio
sweater and yarn company called Cashmere Corporation of Amer-
ica. Almost immediately Arsham found himself in dire need of
financing and in early 1964 made contact with a New York lawyer
named Levy. Levy, after making a number of abortive efforts to
obtain a mortgage for Arsham, finally arrived at the doorstep of
Birnbaum, a mortgage broker. Levy and Birnbaum then discussed
the possibility of getting the needed loan from a union pension
fund.
Birnbaum and his associate Herbert Itkin met in June, 1964,
with James Plumeri, a gentleman of somewhat unsavory back-
ground who was known to have influential contacts in the New
York labor movement. Plumeri agreed to contact the Furriers
Union about a loan for Cashmere. Because Cashmere was unable
to furnish a satisfactory statement of assets, Plumeri was unable
to secure the loan, and Arsham found it necessary to obtain some
form of interim financing in order to keep his creditors at bay. In
late August, 1964, Frank Zulferino, president of Local 10 of the
6 S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. Title IV, Part B (1971) ; S. 3024, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 14 (1971).
7 S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. Title III (1971).
8 Id., Title I, § 107.
9 Id., Title I, § 109.
10 Where noted these descriptions are taken from reported cases. The others, al-
though based on fact, are the product of the author's imagination.
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International Brotherhood of Production, Maintenance, and Operat-
ing Employees, agreed with Itkin that the Local 10 Welfare Fund
would give Cashmere a loan commitment of $1,200,000, so long as
Cashmere would agree in writing that the loan would never have
to be made. Zulferino demanded that Cashmere pay him $24,000 in
return for that commitment.
Itkin suggested to Levy that Arsham could use the Local 10
commitment to obtain short-term credit from a bank and told him
that it would cost four percent of the value of the commitment to
handle the payoffs involved in obtaining it. Levy agreed, and Itkin
proceeded to make a number of cash payments to Zulferino, finally
obtaining the written commitment which he gave to Levy minus
the signature page pending receipt of his $48,000 fee. Arsham pro-
duced the fee in October, and Itkin released the missing page,
promising not to cash Arsham's checks unless Cashmere was able
to secure a bank loan on the basis of the commitment. All went for
naught when the Local 10 letter did not, in fact, produce the needed
credit.
In November, the protagonists tried another tack. On Arsham's
behalf, Samuel Berger contacted a Chicago broker, Robert Graff,
at which point Graff came to New York to meet with Levy, Berger,
Arsham, and Levy's cousin Yvette Feinstein. Graff then contacted
Floyd Webb, a trustee of the Central States, Southeast and South-
west Area Pension Fund of the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, about the possibility of arranging a $1.5 million loan from the
Fund to Cashmere. Webb and Graff agreed that Webb would receive
$20,000 for his efforts. Graff then passed the word on to Berger,
who agreed that they in turn would demand from Cashmere a fee
of ten percent of the loan.
Meanwhile, Itkin, who was unwilling to give up entirely the
prospect of receiving his $48,000, arranged in mid-December for a
meeting with Plumeri, Zulferino, Arsham, and Berger at which
Cashmere's continuing need for interim financing pending the Team-
sters loan was to be discussed. At that meeting, $15,000 in interim
financing was obtained, but Plumeri threatened to stop the Team-
sters loan from going through unless Berger would guarantee Ar-
sham's payment of the $48,000. In fact, the $48,000 was never
paid.
In March, 1965, Arsham received a written commitment from
the Teamsters, and Cashmere obtained the funds it needed by
"banking"" the commitment letter at a Chicago bank. The $150,000
11 A borrower who receives a commitment from a pension fund for permanent
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fee was divided among Graff, Berger, Levy, Levy's cousin, and
Webb.12
2. A Midwest businessman engaged in manipulating the
stock of his medium-sized electronics company on the over-the-
counter market was concerned about the possibility that large
blocks of the stock would be sold in the open market. Therefore, he
tried his best to insure that any sales which did occur would be
made at an artificially created price between buyers and sellers
selected by him. At one point, he found himself faced with the neces-
sity of finding a buyer for some $500,000 of the stock. After failing
to procure a buyer, he decided that, as a last resort, he would sell
the stock to his company's employee pension plan of which he was
a trustee. A problem was presented by the fact that the plan's
assets totalled only $400,000, but this difficulty was quickly re-
solved by arranging for the pension plan to borrow the purchase
price from a local bank. It took the businessman almost a year to
find another buyer who was willing to take the plan's stock at the
price the plan had paid, but he finally arranged the sale and the
plan was able to pay off the bank loan. The businessman was not
able to reimburse the plan for the $32,000 interest which it had
paid on its loan.
3. An enterprising union leader in a large Eastern city special-
ized in organizing small companies, the employees of which were for
the most part unskilled and frequently unable to speak, read, or
write English. In return for a relatively small monthly contribu-
tion to the union's health, welfare, and pension fund, an employer
was ensured that he would be free from interference with the con-
duct of his business and free from the threat that another, more
energetic labor organization would seek to represent his employees.
The funds were properly established pursuant to trust agree-
ments, which called for an equal number of employer and union
trustees.18 However, the employer trustees were not particularly
financing will frequently take that commitment to a bank and secure immediate in-
terim financing with the bank relying on the obligation of the fund to take over the
loan at some later date.
12 These transactions are described in United States v. Berger, 433 F.2d 680 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971), the trial of which resulted in the convic-
tion of Levy on Count Two (Zulferino transaction) and Count Three (Webb transac-
tion), both charging substantive violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1954, the conviction of
Berger on Count Three and the conviction of Yvette Feinstein on Count Three. The
court of appeals affirmed Levy's conviction on Count Two and Berger's on Count Three
and reversed as to Levy on Count Three and reversed as to Feinstein. Mistrials were
declared as to Zulferino and Plumeri because the former's attorney died and the latter
became ill himself. Webb died before the indictment was returned. Itkin, Graff, Birn-
baum, and Arsham testified for the government-Graff after a plea of guilty.
13 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302, now 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
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interested in what was done with the money they contributed and
were all too content to leave the management of the funds to the
union official, who staffed the pension plans with his family and
friends. The operation was so profitable that the official decided
to expand the plans by soliciting contributions from employers
whose employees were not represented by his union but who might
eventually wish to avail themselves of the benefits of the group
health plan. This scheme provided the union leader with approxi-
mately $100,000 a year in operating capital.
4. In 1956, James R. Hoffa, then the president of Local 299
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, initiated a scheme
to use the assets of Local 299 to promote a Florida real estate
project, Sun Valley, in which he held a concealed interest. He di-
rected that $500,000 of Local's funds be deposited in a Florida
bank in a noninterest-bearing account in return for the bank's
lending an equivalent amount to Sun Valley. By 1958, however,
Sun Valley was in financial difficulty, and Hoffa himself was per-
sonally obligated on a $25,000 note. He decided it was necessary to
find sufficient capital to rescue the company from bankruptcy.
In 1958, Hoffa, who was by then International President and
the dominant trustee of the Central States Pension Fund, under-
took to rehabilitate Sun Valley. Two associates, Dranow and Bur-
ris, incorporated the Union Land and Home Company. The cor-
poration paid off the note on which Hoffa was obligated and repaid
Local 299 for the interest lost on the Florida bank account. Bor-
rowers who sought loans from the Pension Fund were required to
"invest" in the company, to pay inflated finders fees, to pay ad-
vances to Sun Valley's creditors, and to employ the accounting firm
controlled by one of the conspirators.
These prospective borrowers, virtually all of whom were
seeking high-risk loans, were represented to be reputable business-
men by Hoffa and his associates, although their loan applications
were replete with false appraisals and audits, they were operating
on borrowed capital, and they did not own the land on which they
intended to build. Many of the loans proved to be less than secure,
and the Fund was forced to grant moratoriums on payments due and
to make additional loans to save the borrowers from collapse.14
5. In 1968, two building trade locals of moderate size decided
14 These transactions are described in United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698 (7th
Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 231 (1967). Hoffa, Dranow, and Burris,
together with a fourth defendant, Kovens, were convicted of mail and wire fraud. The




to set up a health and welfare fund which was to be insured with
a nationally recognized company. A board of trustees was created,
consisting of three union officers and three major employers. A
trust agreement was drawn up setting forth the nature of the
benefits to be furnished and providing that the trustees could select
an administrator and pay him a reasonable fee for performing the
record-keeping and accounting functions necessary to the opera-
tion of the plan. It was anticipated that the plan would have to
cover approximately two thousand union members and would
collect some three hundred thousand dollars a year in employer
contributions.
One of the union trustees approached a friend who was a
local insurance agent and suggested that he submit a bid for the
administration contract. The agent was interested but questioned
his financial ability to invest in the equipment and staff needed
to undertake the management of the plan. The trustee suggested
that the two of them form a corporation and borrow the necessary
capital from the plan. Thus, the trustee and the agent went into
business on the plan's money and with a guaranteed income, but
their enterprise did not stop there. The agent, of course, received
substantial administrative fees through the corporation and com-
missions on the insurance policies purchased by the plan. Realizing
that his commissions were larger in the first two years of a policy's
life, the agent in 1970, determined that the plan could be more
effectively administered through a policy issued by a small, local
insurance company. At the same time, he renegotiated the corpora-
tion's administrative contract with the plan. The trustees unani-
mously approved his request for a higher fee.
III. THE TOOLS
It is worth noting at the outset that federal criminal law is
purely a creation of Congress. A theft may not be a federal crime
unless it is from an entity specifically brought within the federal
jurisdiction; a bribe may not be a federal crime unless paid to a
member of a class defined by Congress; a fraud may not be a
federal crime unless accomplished through interstate mail or tele-
phone facilities. The federal prosecutor is, therefore, frequently
faced with the unpleasant prospect of being unable to act in situa-
tions which require action. The local district attorney sometimes
finds himself in a similar situation, not because of lack of juris-
diction, but rather because he is restricted by lack of investigative
and prosecutive manpower. The federal prosecutor, on the other
hand, usually has the manpower but not the jurisdiction, and it
often requires an expansive imagination and experimentation to
[Vol. 12
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bring obviously "criminal" conduct within the strictures of the
federal criminal code.15
A major factor in the expansion of federal jurisdiction over
crime is the capacity of the federal establishment to investigate and
prosecute cases which, because of their interstate impact, inherent
complexity, or political sensitivity, are not likely to be dealt with by
local authorities. While almost every state has an embezzlement
statute which would cover the theft of pension plan assets, very few
such cases are ever brought to trial because the average district at-
torney and the average police force have no way of learning that
the theft occurred, no way of providing the accounting manpower to
investigate the theft, and have dockets much too crowded to be
able to concern themselves with seeking out violations which may
exist. Until 1962, there was no one to take up the slack in this
particular area of law enforcement. Up to the time when amend-
ments to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958
created Section 66416 of Title 18, stealing from a pension plan was
not a federal offense.
If, however, Congress had done no more than enact Section
664," it is unlikely that there would have been any substantial
increase in federal involvement in this area. It is only the existence
of a federal agency"8 charged with enforcing reporting require-
ments and collecting reports from benefit plans and security com-
panies, that creates the sources of information necessary to develop
prosecutable cases under the statute. This is not to say that the
disclosure required by the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act'9 is, in and of itself, an effective remedy for the problems it
was designed to solve. On the contrary, it has been made clear
during the past fourteen years that the W.P.P.D.A. and its com-
panion statute, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959,20 have failed to make any measurable impact on the
financial abuses which prompted their enactment. It can be said,
however, that the very creation of a new bureaucracy to administer
the W.P.P.D.A. was the first step toward federal assumption of
responsibility for the integrity of pension plan assets. The staff
of the Labor-Management Service Administration of the Depart-
ment of Labor, despite the limitations on its jurisdiction, is at least
15 18 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
16 Id. § 644.
17 Id.
18 Office of Labor-Management and Welfare Pension Reports.
19 Hereinafter referred to as W.P.P.D.A. Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836,
72 Stat. 997.
20 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970).
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in a position to obtain the kinds of preliminary information on which
a criminal investigation can be predicated.
A. The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958
Congressional interest in welfare and pension plan problems
began with hearings in 1953 by the House of Representatives and
a more comprehensive investigation in 1954 by the Senate. During
the 83rd Congress, a special subcommittee chaired by Senator Ives
of New York was created for the purpose of conducting a study of
the characteristics of jointly administered welfare funds set up as
the result of collective bargaining agreements. The committee's
interim report,21 submitted on January 10, 1955, recommended
consideration of a federal disclosure act and the extension of the
congressional investigation to cover all types of benefit plans. In
February, 1955, the Ives Committee, recreated under the chair-
manship of Senator Douglas of Illinois, began hearings centering on
alleged mismanagement in the welfare plans of the Laundry
Workers' International Union and Local 52 of the Painters, Cleaners
and Caulkers' Union, issuing a second interim report on July 20,
1955.22 The Ives Report contained an analysis of twenty-seven jointly
administered funds and concluded that thirteen funds could be
characterized as having questionable management practices, six as
grossly mismanaged, and seven as well managed." The final Douglas
Committee report 24 went into considerable detail in its case studies,
highlighting the general abuses uncovered by the investigation.
A primary concern of the Committee was the payment of
highly inflated commissions and fees by insurance companies. The
Douglfs Report described the activities of Louis B. Saperstein, an
agent, who in 1950 approached the Security Mutual Life Insurance
Company to underwrite the group insurance plan for the Laundry
Workers in return for payment of the commission called for in his
previously negotiated lifetime contract. This commission, a flat
ten percent first-year renawal fee, produced for Saperstein in the
period from April 1, 1950, to September 30, 1953, a total of
$262,500, although under the normal decremental scale applicable
to most insurance sales, he would have received approximately
21 Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., First Interim Report (1955) [herein-
after referred to as the Ives Report].
22 Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., Second Interim Report (1955).
28 Ives Report, supra note 21, at 10-19.
24 S. RES'. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) [hereinafter referred to as the
Douglas Report].
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$18,125.25 When Security informed Saperstein in 1953 that it
would have to reduce its commissions, Saperstein simply switched
carriers and collected an additional $91,000 until the new insurer
finally cancelled the arrangement.2" The Committee found this
practice of switching carriers to be extremely widespread,27 and
indeed elicited testimony from the officer of one company to the
effect that it paid to cancel and reissue an existing policy, thus pay-
ing two first-year commissions, rather than risk losing the business
to another carrier.2
More generally the Douglas Report showed a clear pattern of
abdication of responsibility by the employer, inadequate controls
over disbursement of plan assets, excessive administrative costs,
and failure to make financial reports either to contributing em-
ployers or to beneficiaries. All of this resulted in the passage of
Senate Bill 288829 on April 28, 1958. This bill required the registra-
tion of a broad range of benefit plans and the filing of annual re-
ports. In addition, it provided that the Secretary of Labor could
prescribe reporting forms, issue rules, regulations, and interpre-
tations of the statute, investigate failures to comply with registra-
tion and reporting requirements, bring suit to enjoin violations, and
refer possible criminal cases to the Department of Justice. Further-
more, the bill made it a felony to willfully fail to comply with the
statute, to give or receive kickbacks, to make false entries in or to
destroy plan records, and to embezzle the funds of any plan covered
by the Act. It also made it illegal for anyone to serve as a trustee,
officer, or employee of a plan while deprived of the right to vote in
a state election as the result of any conviction.
The Senate, faced with a wide variety of abuses, most of which
involved self-dealing on the part of plan officers and trustees, sought
to deal with the problem by providing for disclosure of transactions
to those for whose benefit the various plans were supposed to be
administered. The Senate assumed that the beneficiaries would
then be able to take corrective action on their own behalf. There
seems to have been no particular thought given to the possibility
of providing for governmental control over the actual management
of the plans' daily affairs. On the contrary, there was great concern
expressed about the risk of unduly burdening the operation of the
benefit plan system. The essence of the proposal is set out in the
following passages from the debate on 2888:30
25 Id. at 30.
26 Id. at 36; 104 CoNG. Rac. 7204 (1958).
27 Id. at 37.
28 Id.
29 S. 2888, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
3o 104 CoNG. REC. 7051-2 (1958).
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Senator John F. Kennedy: One of the major objectives of the
proposed legislation is to deter abuses. We hope to deter any unscrupu-
lous union officials from dominating and mismanaging plans which in-
volve numerous employer contributors with limited authority. However,
... we cannot ignore this major portion of all plans where the employer
has the complete authority over the finances and destiny of the em-
ployees' economic security....
The inadequacy of standards and safeguards to protect the diffused
interests and equities of some 80 million employee beneficiaries of these
plans logically calls for legislation that will bring the facts with respect
to their financing out in the open. A one-operation, self-policing Federal
disclosure, coordinated with the States' interests, as proposed by S. 2888,
would appear to be the simplest and most economical method of ac-
complishing this. To do less could be to encourage an economic Franken-
stein.
And further along the identical line:
Senator Douglas: The principle the Senator from Massachusetts
has advanced, and which lies at the basis of this effort, is that sunlight
is a great disinfectant; that if there is proper publicity regarding the
affairs of a welfare or pension fund and its management, then the temp-
tation for trustees to abuse their office will be greatly diminished.
I have been mystified for many years as to why so many employers
and employers' associations and insurance companies . . have opposed
a measure such as this one, because it seems to me that if these pro-
grams are being honestly conducted, nothing whatsoever is to be feared
from a disclosure of the facts of investment and the expenses of ad-
ministration.
In fact, I would think the ethical insurance companies-which I
believe outnumber the unethical insurance companies-would welcome a
program such as this one, because it will restrain competitors who are
less scrupulous; and where the administrative costs are too high, or
where rebates or kickbacks are being paid, they will be eliminated; and
therefore the ethical companies will be freed from the unfair competi-
tion by companies which engage in such practices. 8'
Perhaps only the benefit of hindsight makes Senator Douglas'
statement concerning the opposition of insurance companies and
employers seem naive, although one would like to think that the
Senator spoke with tongue in cheek. Looking back on the history
of enforcement under W.P.P.D.A., even after its amendment in
1962,82 it might be more accurately suggested that other reasons
existed why neither group had cause for concern-the former be-
cause the Act posed no threat to their conduct of business as usual,
and the latter because there was nothing in the Act which required
them to abandon their posture of blissful ignorance.
81 Id. at 7053.82 Act of Mar. 20, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35.
[Vol. 12
ROLE OF THE FEDERAL PROSECUTOR
In any event, Senate Bill 2888,"3 although ineffectual, was far
too strong for the members of the House. On July 28, 1958, the
House Committee on Education and Labor reported out of com-
mittee House of Representatives Bill 13507,34 which provided only
for the filing of financial reports with the Secretary of Labor, giving
him nothing more than custodial powers. The members of the House
seemed to be unimpressed with their own investigation and with the
catalogue of abuses uncovered by the Douglas Committee, and after
over four years of study professed themselves unprepared to ven-
ture beyond a minimal disclosure system. A few passages from the
debate3 5 will suffice to depict the attitude of the House.
Congressman Madden: Unfortunately, a relatively small number
of so-called labor leaders have been either negligent or dishonest with
their membership by dissipating, misappropriating, or through unsound
investments jeopardize [sic] the funds which are established for the
purpose of protecting the future welfare and security of their organiza-
tion's membership.
... The participants and beneficiaries of these funds, if they are
familiar and acquainted with the true status of the administration
thereof will be sufficient protection to keep these funds intact and sol-
vent for the purposes for which they are originally intended.
Congressman Lane: H.R. 13507 represents a careful approach to-
ward correction of a difficult problem.
It is moderate in tone, recognizing and avoiding the danger of re-
acting in anger and going to such extremes by punitive action that the
cure would be worse than the complaint.
I think that this bill is admirable in its restraint.
It avoids the creation of a top-heavy bureaucracy to enforce com-
pliance.36
Congressman Teller: . . . Our bill was the result of the effort to cut
down the scope of legislation in this brand new field, where we lack so
much information-to limit the measure of our present legislation to
matters which we understood, leaving for further investigation many of
the regulatory subjects which have to be dealt with.3 7
The Senate bill had little success in the House and was passed
on August 6, 1958, only after it had been amended to conform
almost exactly to H.R. 13507.8 The bill then went to a conference
committee and a somewhat sheepish Senator John F. Kennedy was
forced to report to the Senate that, in order to obtain any bill at all,
it had been necessary for the Senate conferees to give way on vir-
33 S. 2888, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
34 H.R. 13507, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
35 104 CONG. Rzc. 16,419 (1958).
36 Id. at 16,420.
37 Id. at 16,421.
38 Id. at 16,444.
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tually all important points." The bill was then reluctantly passed
by the Senate on the theory that it constituted "a step-even
though a creep in the right direction."4 Its inadequacies were
noted by President Eisenhower at the signing ceremony when he
stated, "Congress has failed to respond effectively to the pleas
for action in this field, and I am sure that the public is as disap-
pointed . . . as I am,' and closed by calling for extensive amend-
ments at the next session of Congress.
B. The 1962 Amendments
Unfortunately, it was not until four years later that the statute
received its much needed facelift. The delay is perhaps explain-
able by the fact that the 86th Congress was preoccupied with pas-
sage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of1959, but in any event it was not until 1961 that the newly
elected Kennedy administration proposed amending legislation
which was introduced in the form of three bills, H.R. 7234,42, H.R.
7235 1 and S.B. 1944. 44 Hearings were held in May and June of1961, with the House taking the lead, holding seven days of hear-
ings to the Senate's one. Virtually identical bills45 were reported
out of committee and adopted by each House, with the conference
report46 being approved almost immediately. The bill was signed
into law on March 20, 1962.:
The hearings leading up to passage of the Act 8 consisted, in
the main, of a repetition of the abuses uncovered earlier by the
investigation of the Douglas Committee. Senator Douglas read
summaries of his earlier report into the record before both the
House49 and Senate50 committees, this report being followed by
some general testimony to the effect that similar misdeeds con-
tinued to be prevalent in the years since passage of the original
statute.5 1 However, there was still no consideration given to the
30 Id. at 17,963.
40 Id. at 17,964.
41 N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1968, at 16, cols. 1 and 2.
42 H.R. 7234, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
43 H.R. 7235, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
44 S. 1944, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
45 H.R. 8723, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. 2520, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).46 108 CONG. REC. 3809 (1962).
47 Id. at 5375.
48 Act of Mar. 20, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35.
49 Hearings on H.R. 7234, 7235 and 7040 Before the Special Subcommittee onLabor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 340-
397 (1961) (hereinafter referred to as 1961 House Hearings].50 Hearings on S. 1944 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 47-105 (1961).
51 1961 House Hearings at 15.
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creation of a full-scale regulatory system, and Congress continued
to rely optimistically on disclosure as the great "disinfectant." This
position can be explained by recognizing that the senators who
fought for S.B. 2888 in 1958 must have believed that, if their bill
had passed, these evils would have been irradicated. Furthermore,
the congressmen who supported the ineffective bill which ultimately
became law must have been sufficiently embarrassed to have con-
cluded that their best course of action would be to acquiesce, even
if belatedly, in the now proven wisdom of the "other body." But
for whatever reason, the theory of the law was the same: tell the
beneficiary of the plan what the people in control of his money are
doing, and he will protect himself.
The 1962 amendments5 2 recreated in somewhat more sophisti-
cated form the disclosure provisions of S.B. 2888,11 by providing
for relatively detailed reports on income, expenditures, investments,
potential conflicts of interest through purchases of stock in or loans
to employer companies, and administrative fees and insurance com-
missions. More importantly, the Act made the Secretary of Labor
something more than a custodian, by giving him the power to inves-
tigate violations of the reporting requirements, to prescribe manda-
tory forms for reporting, and to refer potential criminal violations
to the Department of Justice. These violations included not only
the willful failure to comply with the reporting provisions but
violations of three newly enacted sections of the federal criminal
code. 4
Section 66411 is a general theft statute modeled directly after
Section 501(c) 5 6 of Title 29, which had been enacted as part of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.11 In
general, it prohibits any misappropriation of benefit plan funds
covered by the Act without regard to the troublesome common law
distinctions among larceny-type offenses. Section 102758 makes it
52 Act of Mar. 20, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35.
58 See note 22, supra.
54 18 U.S.C. §§ 664, 1027, 1954 (1970).
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 644 (1970) reads:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or
converts to his own use or to the use of another, any of the moneys, funds,
securities, premiums, credits, property, or other assets of any employee wel-
fare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan, or of any fund connected
therewith, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
As used in this section, the term 'any employee welfare benefit plan or
employee pension benefit plan' means any such plan subject to the provisions
of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
56 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1970).
57 Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.
58 18 U.S.C. § 1027 (1970) reads:
Whoever, in any document required by the Welfare and Pension Plans Dis-
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a felony to submit false reports to the Secretary of Labor, to makefalse entries in the books of a plan, and to conceal facts required
to be disclosed or necessary to verify the plan's reports. It re-places the provision of the original Act 9 which attempted, withquestionable legality, to make the general false statement statute,e°
applicable to the submission of false reports. Section 195461 pro-hibits certain specified officers and employees of any benefit plan,
any employer whose employees are covered by the plan, any labor
organization whose members are covered by the plan, and any
organization providing services to the plan from receiving kick-
backs with the intent to be influenced in connection with their
administrative duties. The statute also makes it an offense to pay
a kickback to any of the named persons.
The extent and shortcomings of these provisions will be dis-
cussed in the context of the previously cited "case histories."62
closure Act (as amended from time to time) to be published, or kept as partof the records of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pensionbenefit plan, or certified to the administrator of any such plan, makes anyfalse statement or representation of fact, knowing it to be false, or knowingly
conceals, covers up, or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure of which isrequired by such Act or is necessary to verify, explain, clarify or check foraccuracy and completeness any report required by such Act to be certified,shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
59 Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 9, 72 Stat. 1002.
60 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
61 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970) reads:
Whoever being-(1) an administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, agent, or em-ployee of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefitplan; or(2) an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employer or an em-ployer any of whose employees are covered by such plan; or(3) an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employee organization
any of whose members are covered by such plan; or(4) a person who, or an officer, counsel, agent or employee of an orga-
nization which, provides benefit plan services to such plan
receives or agrees to receive or solicits any fee, kickback, commission, gift,loan, money, or thing of value because of or with intent to be influenced
with respect to, any of the actions, decisions, or other duties relating to anyquestion or matter concerning such plan or any person who directly or in-directly gives or offers, or promises to give or offer, any fee, kickback, com-
mission, gift, loan, money, or thing of value prohibited by this section, shallbe fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, orboth: Provided, That this section shall not prohibit the payment to or accep-tance by any person of bona fide salary, compensation, or other payments
made for goods or facilities actually furnished or for services actually per-formed in the regular course of his duties as such person, administrator,officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, agent, or employee of such plan, employer,
employee organization, or organization providing benefit plan services to
such plan.
As used in this section, the term (a) 'any employee welfare benefit plan'or 'employee pension benefit plan' means any such plan subject to the pro-visions of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, as amended, and(b) 'employee organization' and 'administrator' as defined respectively insection 3(3) and 5(b)(1) and (2) of the Welfare and Pension Plans Dis-
closure Act, as amended.
62 See text accompanying notes 12-14, supra.
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1. Section 1954. Section 1954,63 the statute under which Berger
and his associates in the enterprise described above64 were con-
victed, seems on its face to be a simple and effective anti-kickback
law; indeed, the facts in Berger fit neatly into its provisions to the
extent that all that is really needed for conviction is a way of de-
veloping the relevant information.6" There is little conceptual diffi-
culty in holding that one who pays or conspires to pay money to a
trustee of a welfare or pension fund has violated the law; nor is
there any particular difficulty in reaching a similar conclusion when
the payment is made to an accountant who "established an agency
relationship" with a fund by "rendering advice . . . on a regular
basis, including giving . . . advice regarding the financial status
of potential borrowers."6 6 Beyond these specific facts, however,
are the gray and troublesome areas left unresolved by the statute.
Section 19547 prohibits any type of payment either because
of, or with the intent to, influence the actions, decisions, or duties
of a class of persons having a specified relationship to particular
organizations. This class consists of administrators, officers, trustees,
custodians, counsel, agents, and employees. Yet, only one of those
terms-administrator-is defined. It is clear, however, from a
statement made by Senator MacNamara, chairman of the Senate
Labor Subcommittee, that Congress did not intend to restrict the
class to "fiduciaries" in the narrow sense of the term:
What we deal with here is more than technical and goes beyond
those considerations which are termed as 'fiduciary' and the like.
This involves the hopes and expectations of the majority of our
people.
A trust fund depleted by connivance and corruption can shatter the
lives of all too many people.
I trust we will provide the means to wipe out such individual trag-
edy by the enactment of this bill.
68
But, even if a liberal approach to statutory interpretation is
taken, serious questions arise with respect to the reach of the pro-
hibition69 as it affects its two broadest categories-"counsel" and
"agent." As to the former, legislative history gives very little indi-
63 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970).
64 See note 12, supra.
65 It is noteworthy in terms of this very special problem of information gather-
ing that Berger, Russo, and a number of other cases arising in the Southern District
of New York were "made" with the help of Herbert Itkin, a man who was on the
inside of a wide range of transactions involving benefit plan loans and kickbacks.
66 United States v. Russo, 442 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3310, Jan. 11, 1972.
67 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970).
68 108 CONG. REc. 1924 (1962).
69 The prohibition spoken of is that of 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970).
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cation as to whether Congress intended to refer to legal counsel or
intended to use the broader meaning of "one called in to advise."7
It can be assumed that, since Congress could have used some specific
term such as "attorney" if it meant only legal counsel, the broader
meaning was intended. In fact, this was the position taken by the
trial judge in United States v. McCarthy,7 when he charged thejury that the statute covered "counsel in the broader sense of an
advisor, one who recommends a course of action to the Fund."7
On appeal, the Second Circuit found it unnecessary to reach thequestion by concluding that the proof established the defendant's
agency status. 78
Although classical agency theory seems to rely on the power
of the purported agent vis-d-vis third parties to determine whether
the necessary relationship exists,74 the courts have not been uniform
in taking that approach when dealing with Section 1954. 7' As noted
above, the court of appeals in Russo considered the services which
the "agent" performed for the fund without reference to whether
or not he represented the fund in dealing with those who were seek-ing loans. The court did not discuss the trial judge's instructions
although the instructions were explicit in detailing the facts upon
which the jury could rely in determining whether the defendant was
an agent.70
70 WEBSTER'S Timna NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961).
71 Crim. No. 68-467 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd sub. nom., United States v. Russo,
442 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3310, Jan. 11, 1972.72 Transcript of United States v. McCarthy, supra note 71, at 1692.
73 See United States v. Russo, 442 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3310, Jan. 11, 1972.
74 See 1 F. MECHEM, AGENCY § 36 (4th Ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 12 (1958).
75 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970).
76
By agent I mean one who by the authority or direction of another person
or firm or group as principal undertakes to transact business or manage one
or more aspects of the affairs or business of the principal and render an ac-
count or report to that principal. Put simply, an agent is a deputy appointedby his principal to assist in bringing about a business deal or business rela-tionship between the latter and third persons or firms. Thus if you find fromthe proof beyond a reasonable doubt that in respect to the loan to the Hos-pital Holding Corporation, at least, Wenger in his capacity as auditor of theFund was engaged by the trustees of the Fund to examine financial state-
ments of Mr. Giamonco and to give his advice and professional opinion ofthem as a basis for the contemplated personal guarantee of the loan byGiamonco and you further find that as auditor Wenger stood ready to andactually gave financial advice, as sought by the trustees of the Fund, thenyou would be entitled to find that he was a counsel or agent, as required by
the statute and as contended by the government.
Incidentally, in this connection I point out that it is not necessary thatyou find from the proof that Wenger was the one who had the authority toand actually did make the final decision on the approval of the loan to Hos-pital Holding Corporation. It is sufficient under the law, in other words, ifyou determine that he was in a position to give evaluation, advice and
recommendations which, though not controlling in the final sense would have
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In the first case to reach the courts under Section 1954, the
issue of agency was dispositive, with the result unfavorable to the
government. In United States v. Marroso,7" the defendant, a broker
who held himself out to prospective borrowers as having influence
with the trustees of a pension fund, was charged with violating
Section 1954 by accepting finders fees while an "agent" of the fund.
The trial judge granted Marroso's motion for acquittal, holding
that, despite representations made concerning his powers as an
agent, there had been no proof of any action on the part of the
fund which could have been said to amount to even a minimal con-
sent to the agency. Although it is true that this sort of manifesta-
tion would be necessary to bind the fund to Marroso's
representations on its behalf, it may properly be asked whether
the same rule ought to apply in determining whether Marroso was
guilty of accepting a kickback. If he knowingly held himself out
to borrowers as being able to influence the fund to grant loans, and
in fact did play a role in securing the loans, should he then be able
to defend against a charge that he violated the statute by saying
that he was just fooling? Would the court, for example, have looked
behind Marroso's statements if the borrowers had been on trial
for making a prohibited payment? In a practical sense, of course,
one in Marroso's position is an agent for both the fund and the
borrower, and this dual status raises the single most difficult prob-
lem in interpreting Section 1954.78
some influence on the final decision or decisions. Transcript of United States
v. McCarthy, supra note 71, at 1692-93.
77 250 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
78 Section 1954 contains the following proviso:
Provided, That this section shall not prohibit the payment to or acceptance
by any person of bona fide salary, compensation, or other payments made for
goods or facilities actually furnished or for services actually performed in the
regular course of his duties as such person, administrator, officer, trustee,
custodian, counsel, agent, or employee of such plan, employer, employee
organization, or organization providing benefit plan services to such plan.
18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970).
What, in the last analysis, does this proviso mean? At first blush, it would seem
to be intended to cover a situation in which someone outside the plan pays money to
an officer or trustee of the plan as a legitimate payment for services; but this cannot
be so, for the mind boggles when asked to conceive of a situation in which a borrower
seeking a loan or a banker seeking deposits would be paying for services performed
"in the regular course of [the payee's] duties." Alternatively, perhaps the proviso is
intended to make certain that the receipt of salary or other compensation from the
plan or one of its officers, administrators, agents, or counsel is not held to be a viola-
tion, but again it must be asked whether the case can be imagined in which such a
payment would be made to influence the recipient in the conduct of his duties. It may
be that a corrupt officer could arrange to raise the salary of a fellow officer in order
to convince him to participate in a fraud on the plan, but the likelihood of such a
situation arising does not seem sufficiently high to have called for a special exception,
particularly when, even without the proviso, the payment of bona fide salary would
seem by its own force to fall outside the statutory prohibition.
On the other hand, one can posit a case in which a financial consultant to the
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The problem of dual agencies arises most frequently in con-
nection with the role of the money-finder, who, appearing in a
variety of guises, is a key member of the benefit-plan loan system.
A money-finder performs the vital function of bringing together
the borrower and the lender, but in doing so must tread a very thin
line between the legitimate and the illegitimate. It must be his stock
in trade to develop continuing relationships with lending institu-
tions, and he must be able to advertise his special abilities. He can
be of as much service to the benefit plan in finding secure invest-
ments as he can be to the borrower in finding favorable loans. How-
ever, he runs the serious risk of confusing his loyalties: when he
accepts his fee, is he being paid for services rendered or is he taking
a payoff?
The range of possible variations in the relationship among
broker, borrower, and lender is a broad one, but, for analytical
purposes, four categories are readily discernible:
1. The borrower's attorney (Levy in the Berger case)" or
personal financial advisor with a continuing relationship to him.
2. The independent consultant/money broker who is hired
by the borrower for a fee contingent on the obtaining of a loan,
either with no particular lender in mind or with some specific
lender in mind but with no reliance on any extraordinary re-
lationship between broker and lender.
3. The independent consultant/money broker who has a special
and continuing relationship with the lender as advisor, ac-
countant (as in the Russo case"0), or attorney and is hired by
the borrower because of that relationship.
4. The plan's financial consultant, attorney, or accountant who
is actually paid by the plan.
plan is also hired by a prospective borrower to represent him and is paid a fee for
arranging a loan. It cannot, however, be contended that the proviso would legitimate
such a transaction even if the fee paid by the borrower were characterized as bona
fide payment for services in the course of the recipient's duties as an agent of the
fund, and second, and more importantly, such a reading of the proviso would wholly
emasculate the statute. One can only conclude, then, that because the statute is drafted
in terms of a general prohibition on the receipt of payment and makes the giving of
payment an offense only if the receipt is prohibited [compare Section 302 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970), which defines the offense
in terms of proscribed payments and makes the legality of receipt hinge on the legality
of the payment] someone must have thought that it was necessary to spell out the
exception [compare again the structure of Section 302] to ensure that plan officials
could receive their pay checks. But, as has been indicated, such concern seems to be
entirely unnecessary, and it can only be hoped that a concerted effort to ignore theproviso will meet with the support of the courts should the question of its meaning
ever be raised.
79 See note 12, supra.
80 United States v. Russo, 442 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3310, Jan. 11, 1972.
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Situations one and four above present no problem; it is proper
for the borrower to pay the members of the former class and improper
for him to pay the members of the latter. Situations two and three
make up the gray area: it is probably permissible to pay members of
the second class and probably impermissible to pay members of the
third, but the lines between the two are blurred at best.
The Marroso8 ' opinion, with its application of pure agency
theory, suggests that the otherwise independent broker becomes a
member of the prohibited class only if there is some formal arrange-
ment between him and the plan; not necessarily a contract or the
giving of compensation, but at least an acknowledgement by the
plan of the authority of the broker to act on its behalf is arranging
loans. The Russo 82 opinion, on the other hand, suggests that the
independent entrepreneur may become an agent within the meaning
of the statute if he becomes involved in a pattern of activity which
encompasses advice to or the performance of other services for the
plan. The difficult questions for the prosecutor, who makes the
preliminary judgment, concern the quantum and character of the
evidence necessary to establish a violation: for example, can an
agency relationship established for one loan be presumed to con-
tinue even without specifically renewed authority, or can the rela-
tionship be established by proof of a pattern of approved loans pro-
posed by a particular broker?
Suppose, for example, that a broker proposes to the trustees of
a pension plan which he represents that he will make available to
the trustees his expertise in evaluating potential borrowers and will
bring profitable investment opportunities to the plan in return for
the authority to hold himself out as a consultant to the plan and
discloses that he intends to seek his payments only from the bor-
rowers whose loans he arranges. Is this broker an agent of the plan
who should be prohibited from receiving the payments he intends
to demand from the borrowers? No legislative history or court deci-
sion affords any assistance in answering the question, although the
answer must be "yes" if the statute is to be other than a dead letter.
The purpose of Section 1954 s is to ensure that the trustees',
officers', and employees' judgment be made solely on the basis of
what is in the best interests of the plan's beneficiaries. Any pay-
ment which has a potential impact on that judgment is presump-
tively improper. If the trustees rely on the advice of any person in
81 United States v. Marroso, 250 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
82 United States v. Russo, 442 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3310, Jan. 11, 1972.
83 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970).
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connection with their loan decisions, they are entitled to have that
advice rendered on the merits of the application and not because
the advisor has been paid by the applicant. Even if they know that
he has been paid, they are placed in the position of relying on
biased advice-a reliance which itself may be in violation of their
fiduciary responsibility. 4 Effective enforcement of the law in this
area requires that the prosecutor take the position, at least at the
investigative stage, that unless a broker or consultant comes to the
plan as a disclosed partisan representative of the borrower, he pre-
sumptively violates Section 195485 by accepting a payment with theintent to be influenced thereby in any of his actions, decisions, or
duties.
This proposition is intentionally framed in the negative, for it
is incumbent on the prosecutor under such circumstances to take
as unyielding a line in interpreting the law as the courts will permit.
Any continuing relationship between the financial consultant and
the plan requires him to prosecute the consultant who accepts pay-
ment from the borrower. It is less clear what is required when the
evidence shows only that the consultant misrepresented his status
in dealing with an isolated loan application; however, it is easy to
envision a case where a plan officer or trustee recommends the
consultant to the plan as a purportedly independent advisor, even
though the consultant is, in fact, being paid by the borrower. Under
those circumstances a prima facie violation of the statute seems to
be present.86
It is because the prosecutor can have a real impact in this type
of situation that he must act with particular care. The prosecution
of embezzlement cases will have very little effect on the number of
defalcations which may occur, but because the brokers who make it
their business to deal with benefit plans on behalf of borrowers are
not a large group, the prosecution of one of them for conduct which
up to that time had gone unpunished is likely to persuade the
others to re-examine their conduct. Normally, under other statutes
this function would be performed by administrative or civil in-junctive action, a mechanism much better suited to the drawing offine distinctions than the criminal process. It is very difficult for the
prosecutor to make even the preliminary decision to seek an indict-
ment in cases where he determines that a prospective defendant's
84 Dept. of Labor, Administration of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act, Calendar Year 1971, at 6 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as the 1971 W.P.P.D.A.
Report].
85 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970).
86 Of course, if it can be proven that the plan officer participated in receipt of
the kickback, the problem is resolved by charging the consultant as a payor.
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conduct was improper but where he can anticipate a defense based
on the defendant's arguably reasonable belief that the statute did
not encompass his activities. Moreover, it is even more difficult
to explore these gray areas in a criminal trial when the government
is forced to bear the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt and a man's freedom and reputation are at stake.
2. Section 664. There are many ways of stealing money from a wel-
fare or pension plan. One automatically thinks of the accountant
who falsifies the books or forges checks and runs off with $1000
for doctors' bills or $50,000 to pay his bookie. But this type of
theft, although obviously a problem, is by no means the greatest
danger to the security of the plan. In the five years since surety com-
panies have been required to file reports on their experience with
the bonding of persons handling the funds of benefit plans,
87 only
fifty-five such losses have been reported. 8 Even though that figure
may not give a totally accurate picture of the incidence of theft,
8 9
it is at least indicative of the fact that direct stealing of plan assets
is not by any means an overwhelming problem. Periodic internal
audits and subsequent claims made on the sureties will serve to
bring cases of simple theft to the attention of the Office of Labor-
Management and Welfare Pension Reports (O.L.M.W.P.R.). °
The real problem, and one to which there is no easy solution, is how
law enforcement authorities can bring their efforts to bear on the
much broader areas of misuse and misappropriation of plan assets.
There are opportunities for theft in three general areas of a
plan's operation: collection of contributions, payment of benefits,
and investment. In the first area, the plan's staff is charged with
receiving the weekly or monthly payments made by the plan's
members which, depending on the size of the plan, could total as
much as several hundred thousand dollars a month. Whenever this
kind of money flow is present, particularly in small, less organized
health and welfare plans, there is room for larceny.
9 The second
87 29 U.S.C. § 441 (1970).
88 1971 W.P.P.D.A. Report at 6.
89 Id: "Since dishonesty losses may remain hidden for many years, the W.P.P.D.A.
bonding experience of the reporting surety companies to date may not be entirely
representative."
90 The Office of Labor-Management and Welfare Pension Reports is a branch of
the Labor-Management Services Administration of the Department of Labor and is
charged with receiving, examining, and making available for disclosure the reports
required by the W.P.P.D.A., enforcing compliance with the Act, and issuing rulings
and interpretations.
91 In United States v. Moore, 427 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1971), the defendant, executive secretary of an association of employers, was
convicted on ten counts charging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 664. The association estab-
lished a health benefit plan in the form of a trust which was to secure various types
of insurance for the owners, partners, and employees of member firms. The defendant
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area presents somewhat more sophisticated problems, for the
danger here is that the plan's assets (whether welfare or pension)
may be misused by having benefits paid to persons not entitled to
them. This may involve anything from mere technical violations
of the plan's regulations concerning eligibility to clear cases of
payments to persons who have failed to keep up the required con-
tributions, or who are total strangers to the plan. The third area
is the most troublesome since misuse of funds can be easily con-
cealed, violations are more complex, and it is frequently difficult todistinguish between criminal misuse and unwise judgments that
may call only for civil redress.
In this area, the prosecutor's tools are fitted to the task. Section
66492 of Title 18 (with one exception identical to the embezzlement
section98 of the L.M.R.D.A.94) is worded to avoid the difficulties en-
countered by the draftsmen of earlier larceny statutes-the fiduciary
status of the embezzler and the requirement of an asportation in
stealing, for example. It includes four methods of committing the
statutory crime: embezzlement, stealing, abstraction, and conver-
sion. These methods are intended to encompass every conceivable
criminal taking and, in particular, the term "unlawful and willful
conversion" has been held to reach "misuse or abuse of property[as well as] use in an unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized ex-
tent of property placed in one's custody for limited use .... )95
The broad scope of this language affords the prosecutor the option
to intervene in matters involving something other than classic theft
offenses.
instructed an association employee, who was in charge of paying the monthly pre-
miums out of the trust, to make the checks payable to the insurance company for
more than the required amount. The insurance company issued refund checks payabledirectly to the association rather than to the trust, and they were negotiated by thedefendant, who used the proceeds to pay his personal bills. In addition, the trustees
authorized the payment of fees to the association far in excess of the administrative
expenses incurred by it in servicing the insurance fund, and the excess was diverted tothe personal benefit of the defendant. The court of appeals found that these facts,
stipulated to at trial, were "amply sufficient," id. at 42, to sustain the conviction.
92 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1970).
9s 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1970).
94 Whereas 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) can only be violated by an officer or employee ofa labor organization, Section 664 (18 U.S.C.) uses the term "whoever" in describingthe class of potential defendants. The legislative history does not discuss the reasonsfor this change, but the broader language would encompass, for example, the burglary
or robbery of a plan's assets by a total stranger. It is, however, unlikely that anylarge number of cases will arise in which one, who is not otherwise connected withthe fund, commits one of the more sophisticated forms of larceny at which the statuteis primarily directed. One benefit should be noted: the use of "whoever" does eliminatetroublesome proof problems which have arisen under Section 501(c) where the rela-
tionship of the thief to the organization is uncertain.
95 Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 272 (1952), construing 18 U.S.C.§ 641 (1970).
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When applying Section 66496 to the facts outlined in the second
case history described above,9 7 the pertinent questions are whether
any unlawful conversion occurred, and, if so, when it occurred. If
it is assumed that the businessman was engaged in illegal or illegiti-
mate manipulation of his company's stock, a strong argument can
be made that the mere purchase of the stock by the plan was an un-
lawful conversion. In other words, the businessman by committing
the plan to the bank obligation, has burdened its assets for a pur-
pose wholly removed from the use authorized in the trust agreement.
A trust agreement will, normally, contain a general authorization
to the trustees to invest the assets of the plan, and the trustees
should not be held criminally liable"8 for making investments which
are either risky when viewed before the fact or which later turn out
to be damaging to the plan. However, where the motivation for the
investment can be shown to be the benefit of a third party or, as in
the case at issue, that of a trustee or an officer of the parent em-
ployer, what may have been merely imprudent begins to take on
a criminal aspect.
As a practical matter, however, the prosecutor has another
alternative. Faced with this problem of investment by a benefit
plan in the stock of the employer, he can take a much narrower ap-
proach. Rather than rely on the theory that the conversion occurred
by virtue of the purchase itself, it is possible for the prosecutor to
proceed without pushing the statute to its farthest limits by charg-
ing that the businessman unlawfully converted the amount of inter-
est the plan paid without reimbursement ($32,000 in the situation
in the second case history).19 At trial, it will still be necessary to
show that the purpose of the entire scheme was to assist in the
improper manipulation of the company's stock, that the plan was
forced to buy the shares at a price above that which would have
prevailed had the stock been bought and sold on the open market,
and that the defendant was instrumental both in causing the pur-
chase to be made and in causing the plan to bear the expense of the
loan. By adopting this more limited stance, the prosecutor can frame
the case in terms of actual money lost-a concept more closely re-
lated to the typical theft offense and more easily grasped by both
court and jury than the somewhat more amorphous "misuse" of plan
assets.
These examples are typical of the kinds of judgments the
prosecutor must make when dealing with a broad statute which has
96 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1970).
97 See text accompanying note 12, supra.
98 Here civil redress is the proper remedy.
99 See text accompanying note 12, supra.
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not yet been thoroughly explored by the courts and which may sup-port an expansive interpretation of federal jurisdiction despitebeing rooted in basic common law concepts of unlawful taking.Although the prosecutor may wish to see the courts confirm hisbroad view of the statute, there is little point in forcing an unneces-
sary confrontation when a simpler alternative is available. Theproblem may have to be faced when the plan makes an investmentfor the purely personal benefit of a trustee but does not sustain
a loss or, indeed, actually makes a profit. However, the problem need
not be met until the facts leave no alternative. Should the prosecutor
with sufficient evidence in such a case take the position that thedefendant subjected the plan's assets to a serious risk and indicthim when the circumstances may arguably call only for administra-
tive action? Of course, he must always ask himself whether, as apractical matter, he will be able to convince a jury of the serious-
ness of the offense if he cannot show a loss to the plan, but the ulti-
mate decision goes beyond that point to the more serious question of
whether it is appropriate, in the absence of some provision for
regulatory action, to reach that kind of case through the criminal
process.
Some of the difficulties inherent in this decision-making process
will be relieved, if not eliminated, should Congress enact proposedfiduciary legislation. Both the administration bill' and SenatorJavits' bill' provide for civil actions by the Secretary of Labor to
enjoin violations of the statute as well as actions by participantsin the plan to recover benefits due them. Under that scheme, theUnited States Attorney would, in large measure, revert to a role
which is more appropriate for him-that of prosecutor rather than
regulator. In the case of the $32,000 interest loss,"0 2 indictment
under Section 664 would continue to be the proper course; in the
case in which no monetary loss occurs, the prosecutor could, with
a relatively clear conscience, leave to the Secretary of Labor thetask of enforcing the statutory limitations on investment in stock
of the employer's corporation.o
100 S. 3024, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
1o S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
102 See text accompanying note 12, supra.
103 Section 14(c)(4)(A) of S. 3024 excepts the following transaction from thegeneral prohibition of Section 14(b)(2) against purchasing the property of a party
in interest:
purchasing on behalf of the fund any security which has been issued by anemployer whose employees are participants in the plan under which the fundwas established or a corporation controlling, controlled by, or under commoncontrol with such employer: Provided, That the purchase of any security isfor no more than adequate consideration in money or money's worth:Provided further, That if an employee benefit fund is one which provides pri-marily for benefits of a stated amount, or an amount determined by an em-
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C. Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act
Section 302104 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
19470 5 (popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act)'0 6 was enacted
ployee's compensation, an employee's period of service, or a combination of
both, or money purchase type benefits based on fixed contributions which are
not geared to the employer's profits, no investment shall be made subsequent
to the enactment of this amendment by a fiduciary of such a fund in securities
of such an employer or of a corporation controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with such employer, if such investment, when added to such
securities already held, exceeds 10 percent of the fair market of the assets of
the fund. Notwithstanding the foregoing, such 10 percent limitation shall not
apply to profit-sharing, stock bonus, thrift and savings or other similar plans
which explicitly provide that some or all of the plan funds may be invested in
securities of an employer, or a corporation controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with such employer, nor shall said plans be deemed to be
limited by any diversification rule as to the percentage of plan funds which
may be invested in such securities. Profit-sharing, stock bonus, thrift, or other
similar plans, which are in existence on the date of enactment and which
authorize investment in such securities without explicit provision in the plan,
shall remain exempt from the 10 percent limitation until the expiration of one
year from the date of enactment of this Act.
104 Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 is now codified
as 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
105 Section 302, as amended, now 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970), provides, in pertinent
part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers or
any person who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an
employer or who acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver,
or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value-
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are employed
in an industry affecting commerce; or
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof,
which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any
of the employees of such employer who are employed in an industry
affecting commerce; or
(3) to any employee or group or committee of employees of such
employer employed in an industry affecting commerce in excess of their
normal compensation for the purpose of causing such employee or group
or committee directly or indirectly to influence any other employees in
the exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing; or
(4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization engaged in an
industry affecting commerce with intent to influence him in respect to
any of his actions, decisions, or duties as a representative of employees
or as such officer or employee of such labor organization.
(b) (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive,
or accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any
money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) of this section.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable (1) in respect
to any money or other thing of value payable by an employer to any of his
employees whose established duties include acting openly for such employer
in matters of labor relations or personnel administration or to any repre-
sentative of his employees, or to any officer or employee of a labor organi-
zation, who is also an employee or former employee of such employer, as
compensation for, or by reason of, his service as an employee of such em-
ployer; (2) with respect to the payment or delivery of any money or other
thing of value in satisfaction of a judgment of any court or a decision or
award of an arbitrator or impartial chairman or in compromise, adjustment,
settlement, or release of any claim, complaint, grievance, or dispute in the
absence of fraud or duress; (3) with respect to the sale or purchase of an
article or commodity at the prevailing market price in the regular course of
1972 J
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as a response to the efforts of John L. Lewis to secure from the coal
industry an agreement calling for a fixed amount per ton of coal
business; (4) with respect to money deducted from the wages of employeesin payment of membership dues in a labor organization: Provided, That theemployer has received from each employee, on whose account such deductionsare made, a written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a periodof more than one year, or beyond the termination date of the applicable col-lective agreement, whichever occurs sooner; (5) with respect to money orother thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative,for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and theirfamilies and dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependentsjointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, andtheir families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are heldin trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or both,for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical orhospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation forinjuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provideany of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disabilityand sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on whichsuch payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with theemployer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the ad-ministration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the repre-sentatives of the employers and the representatives of employees may agreeupon and in the event the employer and employee group deadlock on theadministration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered tobreak such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall agreeon an impartial umpire to decide such dispute or in event of their failure toagree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide suchdispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district courtof the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principaloffice, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund,a statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection by inter-ested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other placesas may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments asare intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuitiesfor employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the fundsheld therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensionsor annuities; (6) with respect to money or other thing of value paid by anyemployer to a trust fund established by such representative for the purposeof pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits, or defraying costsof apprenticeship or other training programs: Provided, That the require-ments of clause (B) of the proviso to clause (5) of this subsection shall applyto such trust funds; or (7) with respect to money or other thing of valuepaid by any employer to a pooled or individual trust fund established bysuch representative for the purpose of (A) scholarships for the benefit ofemployees, their families, and dependents for study at educational institu-tions, or (B) child care centers for preschool and school age dependents ofemployees: Provided, That no labor organization or employer shall be re-quired to bargain on the establishment of any such trust fund, and refusal todo so shall not constitute an unfair labor practice: Provided further, Thatthe requirements of clause (B) of the proviso to clause (5) of this subsection
shall apply to such trust funds.(d) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of thissection shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and besubject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for not morethan one year, or both.(e) The district courts of the United States and the United States courtsof the Territories and possessions shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown,and subject to the provisions of section 381 of Title 28 (relating to notice toopposite party) to restrain violations of this section, without regard to theprovisions of section 17 of Title 15 and section 52 of this title, and the pro-visions of sections 101 to 115 of this title.106 Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
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mined to be contributed to a pension fund'17 administered solely by
the United Mine Workers. The statute prohibits any payment from
an employer to a representative of his employees and provides that
willful violations of its provisions are to be punished as misdemean-
ors.""s The regulatory aspects of the statute are contained in a long
list of exceptions to the general prohibition, one of which provides
that payments can be made into trust funds set up to provide health
and pension benefits so long as the trust is "for the sole and exclu-
sive benefit of the employees,"'0 9 the detailed basis for the payments
is set out in a written agreement between employer and employee
representatives, and the trust agreement provides for an annual
audit, the results of which are to be made available to the benefici-
aries and other interested persons. The United States District
Courts have jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the statute."0
Because Section 302 was drafted as a criminal statute and be-
cause its opening paragraphs deal with the serious problem of
bribery of labor union officials, enforcement is entrusted to the
Department of Justice."' However, this means that the prosecutor,
in addition to bearing the responsibility which is properly his-that
of investigating and prosecuting cases involving payoffs by em-
ployers to representatives of their employees, is charged with en-
forcing a law designed to regulate the structure and operation of
welfare and pension plans. This is the classic example of the prob-
lem discussed earlier; for it is obvious that criminal prosecution is
not the appropriate tool for making difficult decisions regarding
the interpretation of complex statutory provisions. The great ma-
jority of Section 302 (c) (5)112 violations will occur because of in-
advertence or reasonable disagreement over the effect of the
restrictions. It makes no sense, either as a matter of efficient ad-
ministration or as a matter of simple justice, to subject either em-
ployer or union to criminal penalties for what are essentially
technical violations, particularly when the Department of Justice
will not, as a matter of policy and because of statutory restrictions,"
3
advise private parties concerning the legality of their conduct.
107 See 92 CONG. REc. 4892-94 (1947); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. at
52 (1947).
108 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
109 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1970).
110 Id. § 186(e).
111 Investigations under section 186 are most often conducted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and prosecutions are conducted by the United States Attor-
neys under the supervision of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.
112 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1970).
113 28 U.S.C. §§ 511, 512, and 513 provide that the Attorney General may ad-




The provisions of Section 302(e)" 4 do afford a civil mecha-
nism for testing the legality of plan 'structures and administration,
but the burden of proceeding under the provision falls on the
private parties involved and not the Government. There has been
a substantial amount of litigation under Section 302(e)-con-
siderably more than under the criminal provisions of paragraph
(d), and recent cases have expanded the reach of federal jurisdiction
to include the matters of internal plan operation that were previously
foreclosed' 15 to judicial examination. The theory of the cases de-
cided under Section 302(e) is that plan beneficiaries must be af-forded the opportunity to ensure that their trustees comply with
the restrictions of subsection (c) (5) in order to protect benefits for
which the employees have bargained," 6 notwithstanding the concern
over the extent to which the federal courts should entertain suits
which seek to review the fiduciary conduct of trustees. In Bowers v.
Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 7 the court of appeals held that the remedy
of injunction is only available to prevent "violations of basic struc-
ture, as determined by Congress, not violations of fiduciary obliga-
tions or standards of prudence in the administration of the trustfund,""' and denied an application for an accounting of allegedly
diverted fund assets.
The emphasis placed by the Bowers court on the "structural"
violations of Section 302 was at issue in Giordani v. Hoffman."'
There, plaintiffs were members of the Upholsterers International
Union (U.I.U.), and the defendants were the individuals making
up the governing boards of the U.I.U., its welfare fund, and its
pension fund. The complaint alleged that the administration of both
funds was in violation of the specific provision of subsection (c) (5)
that such funds be administered "for the sole and exclusive benefit
of the employees." It was alleged that there had been excessive and
improper compensation for the trustees of both funds, that the fundshad practiced nepotism in the hiring of employees (particularly
relatives of Hoffman, the U.I.U. president), that the funds had im-properly employed "social security stewards" who were U.I.U.
employees, that benefits had been improperly extended to officers
114 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1970).
115 Compare Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1956); Giordani v. Hoffman,295 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1969); and In re Bricklayer's Local No. 1, 159 F. Supp.37 (E.D. Pa. 1958), with Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1968) ;Blassie v. Kroger Co., 345 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965); and Moyer v. Kirkpatrick 265F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd 387 F.2d 955 (3rd Cir. 1968).
116 See Blassie v. Kroger Co., 345 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965) (by implication);
Lewis v. Mill Ridge Coals, Inc., 298 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1962) (by implication).
117 393 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1968).
118 Id. at 424.
119 295 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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and employees of the U.I.U., and that there had been improper
self-dealing between the funds and the union.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it went beyond allegations of mere structural deficiencies and
therefore was outside the court's jurisdiction under the rationale in
Bowers.120 District Judge Masterson denied (in part) the motion
to dismiss, stating that:
[T]he plaintiffs have described a pattern of dealings between the
U.I.U. and the trust funds, particularly as reflected by the location of
the offices of all three organizations in the same building in Philadelphia,
which support their contention that the trust funds were not established
for the 'sole and exclusive benefit' of employees....
There is support for dismissing other allegations in the complaint,
such as those relating to the funds' employment of union-employees
[citation omitted], and those attacking the funds' contributions to each
other for the purpose of affording coverage to the individual defendants.
[citations omitted] These practices, however, are related inextricably
to the claim that the trust funds were established for purposes other
than the 'sole and exclusive benefit of the employees,' and any relief
which the Court awards on the basis that the funds were improperly
established inevitably would encompass these practices as well.
121
The steps taken in Giordani122 towards more direct involve-
ment in problems of fiduciary responsibility seem clearly to comply
with the congressional intent underlying Section 302 far more
closely than the restrictive view taken by the court in Bowers. If
Congress were truly concerned that employer payments be made
only to a trust fund with prescribed administrative safeguards-a
fund which would not serve as a "payoff conduit" for union officials
-then there would seem to be strong justification for the courts' re-
quiring strict compliance with the mandate that the fund's assets be
used only for statutorily permissible purposes. It should then fol-
low that any diversion of those assets, whether for the use of the
trustees, the union officers, the employers, or any third party,
should be held to violate Section 302,11 but this rationale has po-
tentially troublesome consequences for the prosecutor. Although he
may conclude that federal jurisdiction is properly invoked to enjoin
violations under subsection (e),124 it does not necessarily follow
that those same violations would call for the imposition of criminal
sanctions under subsection (d).125
120 Id. at 471-472.
121 Id.
122 Giordani v. Hoffman, 295 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
123 See Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 911, 927-28 (1970).
124 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1970).
125 Id. § 186(d).
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Although the Department of Justice has not hesitated to act
in cases which involve the basic employer-union payoff,'26 in only
one case has it proceeded under circumstances involving payments
to a benefit fund which did not comply with subsection (c) (5). In
United States v. Inciso,27 the indictment charged that the defen-
dant, an officer of Amalgamated Local 286, caused that union to
receive approximately $420,000 in payments from the Wisconsin
Can Company and other union employers. The proof at trial estab-
lished that the defendant was in charge of negotiations with the
various employers. As a result of these negotiations, the employers
agreed to make monthly payments to the union consisting of $3 in
monthly dues and from $5 to $6 as insurance contributions for each
employee. These amounts were segregated by the union, and the
insurance payments were placed in the general account. Thereafter,
the union used the payments to purchase insurance but retained $1
of each payment in its treasury. The proof also established that
some years previously the defendant had actually prepared a trust
agreement for the health and welfare plan but had later abandoned
it. The court of appeals concluded that this evidence was sufficient
to support Inciso's conviction for aiding and abetting 28 the union's
violation of Section 302.
The facts of the Inciso2 9 case present what is arguably the
clearest case for criminal prosecution-a blatant failure by a union
official even to attempt to comply with the requirements of subsec-
tion (c). 130 In the situation described in the third case history,' 3 '
the problem is not quite so easily resolved. On its face, the trust
fund complied with the requirement that it be administered by a
board on which employers and employees are equally represented,
but, as is frequently the case, the employers had abdicated their
responsibility and left the management of the fund in the hands of
the union. Further, although the union had written agreements with
the individual employers, whose employees it had organized, de-
tailing the basis for payments as is required by subsection (c) (5),12
no such agreements were made with the employers recruited by the
union leader who informally participated in the fund. In this situa-
126 See e.g., United States v. Iozzi, 420 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 943 (1971); United States v. Fischer, 387 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1969); UnitedStates v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961).In the last five fiscal years, forty-four indictments have been returned under
section 302, and thirty-six defendants have been convicted.127 292 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 920 (1961).
128 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
129 United States v. Inciso, 292 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
920 (1961).
180 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1970).
181 See text accompanying note 13, supra.
132 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1970).
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tion, it is clear, even under Bowers, that plan beneficiaries would be
entitled to relief to remedy this structural deficiency, but the nature
of the employees represented by the union makes it unlikely that this
remedy will be sought. Government intervention188 is wholly proper
under these circumstances. The facts that the union official is in effec-
tive control of the fund and that the substantial possibility exists that
the fund has been or will be used for his personal benefit buttress
the conclusion that prosecution of the official for causing employers
to make payments into a fund not within the exceptions of Section
302 (c) would be an appropriate response.
Confronted with this type of operation, the prosecutor can act
with little hesitation, since he is presented with a situation where
he represents the only feasible solution to the problem and where
the defendant's acts are in clear violation of a specific statutory
provision. A more difficult problem arises where the fund is properly
constituted in every way and there is a written agreement between
the union and each employer detailing the basis for payment, yet,
notwithstanding such agreement the union officer/trustee continues
to use the fund for his own benefit by hiring friends and relatives at
exorbitant salaries to administer the fund and by investing the
plan's assets in his own enterprises. On these facts, should the prose-
cutor charge the officer with causing payments to be made into a
fund which is not used for "the sole and exclusive benefit of the
employees"?
It remains true that the beneficiaries and the employers con-
nected with the fund are unlikely to seek their civil remedies,184
but the prosecutor is now faced with a situation where the statutory
standard measuring an officer's conduct involves a "range concept."
The trial of such a case will require the court and jury to determine
"how excessive" the compensation paid was and "to what extent"
the investments were made for the benefit of the defendant. Even
assuming that the jury were to find as a matter of objective fact
that the fund's assets were not used solely for the benefit of the
employees, there would still remain the question of whether the de-
fendant "willfully x18 5 violated the statute. 8  In the usual case
involving a direct payoff from employer to union official, the Gov-
ernment has taken the position that the element of willfulness is
established by proof that the defendant knew the operative facts,
and this view is supported by the courts. 87 A similar position seems
183 See United States v. Inciso, 292 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 920 (1961).
134 See text accompanying notes 132-133, supra.
185 29 U.S.C. § 186(d) (1970).
136 Id.
187 United States v. Ricciardi, 357 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir.) (by implication),
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justified when dealing with subsection (c) (5) violations that in-
volve failure to secure a written agreement, but it seems that the
"sole and exclusive benefit" violation must require something be-
yond this, at least that the defendants have acted in reckless disre-
gard of the law. 1ssa Therefore, in deciding whether or not to pro-
ceed, the prosecutor must determine not only whether, as a matter
of fact, the defendant's violation of his fiduciary obligation consti-
tutes an offense under the statute but also whether this violation is
so egregious as to justify the jury in concluding that the defendant
acted with the necessary mens rea.ls h
The clearest case for application of the "sole and exclusive
benefit"' 9 theory arises when the trustee of a plan actually steals
the plan's assets, although all but a very few such cases will fall
within the more specific prohibition of Section 664 of Title 18.1
The only case where Section 302 has been used in this type of situ-
ation occurred, logically enough, prior to the 1962 amendments"'
to the W.P.P.D.A. In Arroyo v. United States,'142 the defendant, a
union president, negotiated with the two corporations whose em-
ployees he represented for the establishment of a welfare fund, with
the stipulation that he be made the union representative on the
managing board of the fund. After an agreement was reached, the
defendant asked for the two checks representing the employers'
contributions for the purpose of showing them to union members
at a meeting that evening. The defendant was given two $7500
checks made out to the union, with vouchers attached identifying
them as contributions to the fund. Instead of depositing the checks
in the existing fund account, the defendant opened an account in the
name of the fund in another bank and over the next several months
used the proceeds for his personal purposes and for union expenses
unrelated to the fund. The indictment charged the defendant with
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 942 (1966); United States v. Alaimo, 191 F. Supp. 625, 627
(N.D. Pa.), aff'd, 297 F.2d 604 (3rd Cir. 1961). This rule seems also to have been
approved by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Keegan, 331 F.2d 257 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828 (1965), which limited the more stringent test of Inciso
[292 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 920 (1961)].
188a Korholz v. United States, 269 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 929 (1960).
138b The excessiveness of the compensation, the extent to which the investments
were made for the benefit of the defendant, the willfulness of the violation, and the
determination of whether the defendant acted with the requisite mens rea are all
examples of the problem the prosecutor must face in making the practical deter-
mination whether to proceed with criminal prosecution.
189 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(3) (1970).
140 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1970).
141 Act of Mar. 20, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35.
142 359 U.S. 419 (1959).
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violating Section 302 (b) 45 by receiving $15,000 from the two em-
ployers, and resulted in a conviction.
The United States Supreme Court" reversed the conviction
on the theory that since the checks had been given by the employers
in the legitimate anticipation that they would be used for the wel-
fare fund, the payment did not violate Section 302 (a) 145 and, thus,
the receipt of the checks could not have violated Section 302(b)
(1).146 Justice Stewart wrote:
Without doubt the petitioner's conduct was reprehensible and im-
moral. It can be assumed also that he offended local criminal law. But,
for the reasons stated, we hold that he did not criminally violate
§ 302(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.147
Justice Clark, in his dissenting opinion, concluded on the basis
of the manner in which the checks were handled after receipt and
his finding that the defendant had intended from the beginning to
appropriate the checks to his own use,148 that the checks were not
"paid into a trust fund" within the meaning of subsection (c) (5).
... The petitioner, by receiving the checks from the employers and
through artifice and deceit, has deprived the employees of their bene-
fits and stands guilty under § 302(b) of the Act.
149
Although the government did not rely on it, another theory of
prosecution was available. Since the defendant in this case50 caused
the employers to make contributions to a welfare fund which he
knew would not be used for the "sole and exclusive benefit of the
employees," he was guilty of causing a representative of the com-
pany's employees' 5 ' to receive payment which was not within the
exception provided by subsection (c) (5). From the record, it ap-
pears that this theory was not suggested either at trial or on appeal,
although there is implicit support in Justice Clark's opinion for
148 Now, 29 U.S.C. § 1856(b) (1970).
144 359 U.S. 419 (1959).
145 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1970).
146 Id. § 186(b)(1).
147 359 U.S. at 427.
148 Id. at 429.
149 Id. at 432.
150 Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419 (1959).
151 A trust in which union members participate is a representative of employees
within the meaning of section 302(a) if it does not meet the requirements of sub-
section (c)(5). See Brennan v. United States, 240 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1958); Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers
International Ass'n, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957); Paramount Plastering, Inc. v.
Local No. 2, 195 F. Supp. 287 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 310 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1962).
But see Weir v. Chicago Plastering Institute, 177 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Ill. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1960).
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such an approach. Having been willing to strain the wording of the
statute to conclude that the "paid into a trust fund"' 52 provision
had not been complied with, he would have had an easier time
reaching the same conclusion through the use of the "benefit"
clause.53
This approach to Section 302, if it were restricted to (c) (5)15'
funds, would be of little use to the prosecutor for the only funds
coming under that subsection are also within the provisions of the
W.P.P.D.A' 55 There is, however, a strong argument for applying
the same theory to the vacation, apprenticeship, and scholarship
funds provided for in subsections (c) (6) and (c) (7).156 Those
subsections do not employ the "sole and exclusive benefit" language
of subsection (c) (5) but, rather, are phrased in terms of "for the
purpose of . . ." and then make applicable the provisions of sub-
section (c) (5) (B) regarding the necessity for written agreements
and equal representation. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the lan-
guage of these subsections must be read to impose the same basic
fiduciary obligation as does the language of subsection (c) (5),151
and the diversion of apprenticeship or scholarship funds must, there-
fore, fall within the purview of the statute.
The legislative history behind the enactment of clauses (c) (6)
and (c) (7) 5 reveals nothing concerning the failure to include the
"sole and exclusive benefit" language, although the only reference
to the purpose of (c) (6) is somewhat illuminating. Senator Gold-
water's analysis of L.M.R.D.A. contains the following passage:
To the five exemptions listed in Section 302(c), the conference re-
port adds a sixth: anything of value paid by an employer to a trust fund
established by a union for the purpose of pooled vacations, holiday sev-
erance or similar benefits, or defraying costs of apprenticeship or other
training programs, all subject to the same conditions applicable to wel-
fare and benefit plans under Taft-Hartley prior to its amendment by
this bill.' 5 9
Enforcement of Section 302 in this manner could be of substan-
152 359 U.S. at 431.
153 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1970).
154 Id.
155 The coverage of W.P.P.D.A. overlaps that of Section 302(c)(5) except for
funds covering twenty-five or fewer participants.
16 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(6)(7) (1970).
157 The phrase "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees" is no more
than a codification of the common law duty of the trustee "to administer the trust
solely in the interest of the beneficiaries." 2 ScoTT ON TRUSTS 856 (1939).
158 Section (c)(6) was formerly § 505 of the Labor Management Reporting
Disclosure Act of 1959, Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 and
Section (c) (7) was enacted as Act of Oct. 14, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-86, 83 Stat. 133.
159 105 CONG. RE C. 19,768 (1969).
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tial importance in view of the rapid growth of vacation, apprentice-
ship, and scholarship funds. Unfortunately, there is presently no
federal statute which makes it a crime to steal the assets of such
funds, even though federal interest in their protection is comparable
to that in the safeguarding of welfare and pension funds. The use
of Section 302 to reach what is essentially a theft offense involves
an unusual extension of jurisdiction through a statute which has
not been used for that purpose in the twenty-five years since the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act. The federal prosecutor is, how-
ever, justified in using any available tool to deal with a problem
that is presently beyond the capacity of the average local law en-
forcement agency.
D. Fraud
The relatively small number of criminal prosecutions under
Sections 1954160 and 664161 indicates that the majority of depreda-
tions committed on employee benefit plans do not fit neatly into the
language of either statute, but instead seem to fall under the more
general heading of civil or criminal fraud. The greatest risk for any
plan with large amounts of money to invest is not that someone will
steal directly from the treasury, but rather that the plan will
be duped by affirmative misrepresentations or concealment of mate-
rial facts into lending money or making investments on inadequate
security. Even with all relevant information before them, plan
trustees are liable to make substantial investment errors, although
it is obvious that the effect of such errors will be compounded if the
financial status of the borrower or the nature of the investment is
misstated. This type of misrepresentation, dangerous if made by a
borrower, is infinitely more dangerous if made by or with the coop-
eration of a trustee, officer, or agent of the plan. If the misrepresen-
tation is made by a borrower, there is some chance that the falsity
of the representation will be revealed by independent inquiry, but
such an inquiry is likely to be foreclosed where the misrepresenta-
tion is the product of collusion. Further, in a case like the Sun Val-
ley scheme,'62 the danger is magnified by the fact that the partici-
pating insider is the trustee in effective control of the decision-mak-
ing process.
It is not a crime per se to defraud a welfare or pension plan.
Federal jurisdiction exists only if interstate mailings or wire com-
munications are used in furtherance of the scheme. The courts, how-
ever, have broadly interpreted the wire and mail fraud statutes to
160 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970).
161 Sd. § 664.162 See note 14 and accompanying text, supra.
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enable them to reach schemes where, for example, there is no proof
of benefit to a defrauder" 6 or loss to a victim. 64 In Hoffa,165 it was
the Government's theory that the defendants defrauded the Central
States Fund by misrepresenting to the Fund the financial status of
the borrowers, knowing that the loans sought were substantially
greater risks than they appeared to be on their face, and that the
purpose of the scheme was to obtain from these borrowers, who
were unable to get financing from other sources and were willing to
pay for the privilege of borrowing money, fees which were to be
diverted to the personal benefit of Hoffa and his associates in disre-
gard of the security of the Fund. The interstate nature of the
scheme necessitated the use of the mails and the telephone, thus
enabling the federal government to take action, but had these same
events occurred within the boundaries of one state, they would, in
all likelihood, have gone unnoticed and unpunished.
There is no rational basis for restricting federal jurisdiction in
the area of employee benefit plans by requiring the use of an inter-
state facility before criminal prosecution is possible. Federal juris-
diction has already been asserted over these plans and should be
exercised to the fullest extent necessary to permit effective control.
Although Section 1954 is a useful tool, it requires proof of the most
difficult part of a transaction-the actual transfer of money into
the hands of a plan officer. Yet, the results to a benefit plan may be
as disastrous where the officer participates in a fraud and receives
no kickback as where, in Berger,6 ' for example, he sells out di-
rectly. In terms both of a realistic assessment of the evil to be pre-
vented and the practical problems of proof, there seems to be little
reason for requiring evidence of a bribe as an essential element of
the federal offense.
A difficult problem is presented in determining if criminal
prosecution is warranted where the fraud is perpetrated by the bor-
rower alone or by other parties unconnected with the plan. Stringent
sanctions for the fiduciary who violates his trust can be justified as
necessary to the protection of the plan and consistent with the ap-
proach taken in related areas-bank misapplication cases, etc.; 16 7
however, it must be asked whether these sanctions are the most
163 Calnay v. United States, 1 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1924).
164 Shale v. United States, 388 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
984 (1968); Hoffa v. United States, 367 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated and
remanded, 387 U.S. 231 (1967).
165 See note 14 and accompanying text, supra.
166 United States v. Berger, 433 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
962 (1971).
167 See text accompanying notes 10-14, supra.
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effective or the most appropriate weapon against the individual who
misrepresents solely for personal gain.
Two problems arise most frequently: first, the case where the
borrower simply overstates the value of the collateral for his loan
or inflates his personal net worth; and second, the case where the
borrower, once he obtains a loan, diverts the proceeds for a use in-
consistent with his loan application.
In the first situation, it is clear that the borrower subjects the
plan to risks over and above the ones it bears in the normal course
of doing business. If his misrepresentation is made knowingly, with
the intent to influence the plan, he would seem to have engaged in
criminally fraudulent conduct. Section 1014 of Title 18168 makes it
an offense for anyone to overvalue or make a false statement con-
cerning property for the purpose of influencing a bank or other
lending institution into making a loan, and assuming, as seems
appropriate, that the federal government has a similar interest in
employee benefit plans, their assets should be equally protected. In
the second case, the problem of distinguishing between criminal and
noncriminal activity becomes more acute, for there are often many
reasons why loan proceeds are used for purposes not strictly within
the limits set out in the loan agreement-reasons which can be per-
fectly legitimate or blatantly fraudulent. For example, if a borrower
obtains a loan from a benefit plan for the development of property
or the construction of a building, and the property is to be the se-
curity for the loan, any serious diversion of loan funds from their
intended use places the plan's assets in jeopardy, and if the diver-
sion is accomplished with fraudulent intent, the criminal sanction
is an appropriate remedy.
In Hoffa, the government proceeded on the theory that the
misrepresentations made to the fund and the diversions of loan pro-
ceeds to the benefit of Sun Valley were integral parts of the scheme
168 Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or willfully
overvalues any land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in
any way the action of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Farm Credit
Administration ... a Federal Savings and Loan Association, a Federal land-
bank, a joint-stock land bank, a Federal land bank association, a Federal
Reserve bank, a small business investment company, a Federal credit union,
an insured State-chartered credit union, any institution the accounts of which
are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, any
bank the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, any member of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, or the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administra-
tion, upon any application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase agreement,
repurchase agreement, by renewal, deferment of action or otherwise, or the
acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor, shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1014 (1970).
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to defraud. The majority decision in the court of appeals found the
proof to have been sufficient to support that theory. In the dissent,
however, Judge Swygert concluded, inter alia, that the government's
proof had shown not one but several conspiracies, thereby preju-
dicing the defendants. He found the bulk of the proof concerning
Hoffa's involvement in Sun Valley irrelevant to the fraud charged
except to the extent that it may have shown the motive of the defen-
dants."6 9
Although it is implicit in Judge Swygert's opinion that false
representations made by a borrower for the purpose of procuring a
loan from a benefit plan would constitute a fraud, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the diversion of funds without active misrepresen-
tations cannot call for the imposition of criminal sanctions under a
properly drafted statute. The following is a proposal for a statute
which would consolidate the conversion offenses of Section 664 and
the fraud offenses discussed here:
Misuse of employee benefit plan assets.
(a) Whoever-
(1) embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or
converts to his own use or the use of another any of the assets
of an employee benefit plan; or
(2) by any scheme or device defrauds such plan or makes or
submits a false statement of material fact to such plan or its
administrators, officers, trustees, agents, employees, or counsel
with the intent to cause such plan to make a loan of any of its
assets, or disburse the proceeds of such loan, or otherwise transfer
any of its assets to any person; or
(3) having obtained such a loan, willfully converts the proceeds
thereof to a use not approved by the plan which either adversely
affects the value of any security for such loan or which is in
169 See United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 724 (7th Cir. 1966), vacated and
remanded, 387 U.S. 231 (1967):
c a . If rescuing Sun Valley was an "end," then for purposes of this
case it could have been no more than the lawful object of a conspiracy to
achieve a lawful end by unlawful means.
A similar observation should be made with respect to the aura of
criminality cast about the payment of fees ("pay-offs") and other "diversions"
from loan proceeds as such. The payment of a fee to one who assists in the
procurement of a loan, whatever else it may be, is not of itself a fraud upon
the lender. Nor are "diversions" fraudulent standing alone ...
The gist of the crime charged in this case resides in the allegations and
evidence submitted in respect to false and fraudulent representations made
to the Pension Fund by the defendants. Unless this essential element of the
crime was proved, the alleged diversions of money to Sun Valley, although
necessary to bind the defendants together, were meaningless. ...
... The Government asserts that knowing participation in the conspiracy
is shown by the awareness on the part of certain defendants that the "price"
of getting Pension Fund loans was to make money available to rehabilitate
Sun Valley. While such conduct may be morally reprehensible, it does not
amount to a fraud upon the Pension Fund, the crime charged in the indictment
absent some misrepresentation to the Fund.
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furtherance of an act, plan, or scheme in violation of the laws of
the United States or of the State in which the proceeds are so used
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section the terms-"any employee benefit plan"
means any such plan subject to the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act or any such plan providing pooled vacation, holi-
day, severance, or similar benefits or defraying costs of appren-
ticeship or other training programs or providing scholarships or
child care centers;
"assets" means the moneys, funds, securities, premiums, credits,
property, or other assets of such plan;
"loan" includes the making, renewal, or extension of a loan, or
the acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor.
IV. THE SOLUTIONS
The testimony of Labor Secretary Goldberg before the House
Subcommittee on Labor describes the enforcement of the 1958 Act
in these terms:
... [T]he act's concept is self-policing, relying principally on in-
dividual employees or participants to compel compliance through pri-
vate litigation brought by them or by other means. This is the ultimate
in unreality. Experience has shown that employee suits, if provided as a
means of enforcement, are seldom pursued and therefore are inadequate
as enforcement remedies; the Department of Labor learned this under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Individual employees, lacking financial
resources, can be easily intimidated, subjected to reprisals, and dis-
couraged from taking effective action. To the best of our knowledge,
only one beneficiary suit has been instituted under the Disclosure Act.
170
It provides some insight into the workings of Congress to real-
ize that this analysis of the deficiencies of disclosure was presented
as part of an effort to create a bigger and better disclosure scheme.
Secretary Goldberg, one assumes, believed that the proposed amend-
ments giving the Department of Labor the power to enforce com-
pliance with the Act's reporting requirements would remedy these
deficiencies, but he failed to come to grips with the real problem.
The reason that reliance on individual beneficiaries to enforce the
law is "the ultimate in unreality" is not that individuals cannot be
counted on to make their plan administrators file reports, but rather,
that, even after all the reports have been filed, the individual bene-
ficiary is unable to act on the violations of fiduciary duty which
these reports reveal.
The "unreality" that was perpetuated by the 1962 amend-
ments17 1 is exemplified by the fifth case history described previ-
170 1961 House Hearings, supra note 49, at 13.
171 Plan beneficiaries are not totally powerless to remedy improper administration
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ously.'72 There, the plan, under the influence of one of its trustees,
lent money to a company in which that trustee had an interest to
enable the company to make a contract with the plan providing sub-
stantial fees for administrative services. Nothing in that particular
transaction violated the Act. 78 Only if the trustee conceals his
interest in the company and thereby causes the plan to file an an-
nual report failing to disclose a loan to a party-in-interest, 74 has
a federal criminal statute175 been violated. If the trustee's interest is
disclosed, the federal interest in the plan's operation is terminated;
the fact that the administrative company receives an exhorbitant
fee or that the insurance agent switches policies to obtain higher
commissions is not a matter of concern for the Secretary of Labor,
although these were exactly the kinds of problems uncovered eigh-
teen years ago by the Ives 74 and Douglas 77 Committees.
Of course, the compliance officer in the Department of Labor
who reviews the report may well surmise that, if self-dealing and
high commissions are present, there is a substantial likelihood that
kickbacks are being paid to plan officers or to the trustees, and he
may refer the matter to the Department of Justice. However, this
presupposes that the annual reports will be reviewed closely enough
to disclose these danger signs. Unfortunately, this supposition is
unsupported by the facts. In 1971, the Department of Labor re-
ceived 6,530 initial plan descriptions and 70,525 annual reports.7
During the same period, "desk audits" were performed on 1,665
annual reports (approximately 2.3% of the total received),' and
2,512 "investigative cases" were opened, the great bulk of which-
2,375-involved delinquent reporting.' 0 Of the total of 1,436 cases
closed during 1971, voluntary compliance was achieved in ninety-
five percent.' 8 '
of benefit funds as is evidenced by the successful suit of a number of members of the
United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950. The decision
of District Judge Gesell in Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971),
ordered the Fund's trustees, among whom was W. A. Boyle, president of the union,
removed, ordered the Fund to obtain independent investment counsel, and ordered
the Fund's assets withdrawn from the National Bank of Washington, which was
controlled by the union.
172 See text subsequent to note 14, supra.
173 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1970).
174 Such disclosure is required by 29 U.S.C. § 306(f) (1) (D).
175 18 U.S.C. § 1027 (1970). See note 58 for the text of § 1027.
176 See note 21, supra.
177 See notes 22, 24, supra.
178 1971 W.P.P.D.A. Report, supra note 84, at 5.
179 Id. at 9.
180 Id. at 11.
181 Id. at 10.
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These figures do not represent a failure on the part of the
Department of Labor to enforce the Act; rather they represent
Congressional failure to provide the manpower and equipment nec-
essary to fulfill the aim of the 1962 amendments to make the Secre-
tary of Labor something more than a custodian of records. Even
with the broadest statutory jurisdiction, it is impossible to achieve
effective enforcement of the basic disclosure requirements, on the
results of which litigation by individual beneficiaries must depend,
unless sufficient resources can be made available for the examina-
tion of reports, the collation and retrieval in usable form of the
information contained in the reports, and the investigation of viola-
tions.'8 2 Nor can there be effective criminal enforcement unless
these basic requirements are met and unless an investigative staff
of sufficient size is made available to conduct the full-scale audits
and field interviews necessary for the development of criminal cases.
It was pointed out earlier that the disclosure requirements of the
W.P.P.D.A. have meant that there is an agency which concerns itself
with the problems of employee benefit plans and which can begin to
provide information to the prosecutor charged with enforcement of
the criminal provisions of the Act; however, something more is
needed if federal control over welfare and pension plans is to be-
come anything other than a stop-gap remedy.
This is not to say that the solution to the problem of benefit
plan regulation is an expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction. On
the contrary, the kinds of mismanagement exemplified in the fifth
case history do not readily lend themselves to regulation by criminal
prosecution. The solution is to recognize the inadequacy of criminal
prosecution as a regulatory mechanism and replace it with a system
capable of dealing with the whole range of issues raised by the
operation of the modern benefit plan rather than with only that
limited class of problems which presently warrant the intervention
of the prosecutor.
The first step in this process is to recognize that the federal
government can no longer afford the luxury of excusing itself from
involvement in the internal affairs of benefit plans. Such recognition
is evident in the bills now before Congress which are designed to
establish and enforce certain basic fiduciary standards for plan
182 Reports filed under W.P.P.D.A. are stored in the Department of Labor, and,
except for very basic identifying information, there is no indexing system which would
permit an investigator to determine, for example, how many plans a particular com-
pany performs administrative services for or whether a particular individual has loans
outstanding with one or more benefit plans. Until this type of information can be
readily obtained, preferably through some form of computerization, the utility of the
W.P.P.D.A.'s disclosure system is substantially impaired.
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trustees,"8 3 but in addition to a regulatory system, there must be a
commitment of funds sufficient to permit it to operate effectively.
Until legislation of this type is passed and implemented, the prose-
cutor will continue to do what he can within the limits of his juris-
diction, but he would rather retire to the sidelines, leaving the day-
to-day regulatory battle to those better equipped to cope with it.
188 The standards set out in both S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1971), and
S. 3024, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1971), are virtually identical.
